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No. 59, Jul-Aug 1979

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GUGLIALMELLI UNDERSCORES PATACONIA'S GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Buenos Aires ESTRATEGIA in Spanish No 59, Jul-Aug 79 pp 5-36

[Article by Maj Gen (Ret) Juan E. Guglialmelli: "Patagonia--We Cannot Commemorate Its Incorporation into the Nation 100 Years After Its Occupation"]

[Text] I. Introduction

This year, the nation marks the 100th anniversary of the Conquest of the Southern Desert. This was a great event since the advance toward the southern part of our far-flung territory made it possible to assert our sovereignty there, thus further confirming the country's final boundaries. Patagonia coveted by foreigners, was formally incorporated into the country. But future generations were left with the priority task of populating it, of developing it in an integral manner, so that it might once and for all and definitely become a part of the nation. Roca who, with the best men of the eighties, tackled the transformation of what was then a rather pastoral homeland, left us a historical mandate which as such had irrevocable character.

Today, 100 years later, we must ask ourselves whether this job has been done. The answer, regrettably, is negative. This statement does not mean that we cannot say that there were no periods of progress during this interval of time, that there are no areas that are advancing, and that many things were indeed accomplished. Our judgment here must be based on a broader and more general concept as confirmed by opinions very recently expressed by those who hold the very highest office in the nation, both on the federal and the provincial levels.

"This year we remember the heroes of 'The Conquest of the Desert.' And we do so in culpable awareness that we have not fully developed this true national epic. Vast empty spaces rise before us, like a true challenge to our determination for change and achievement" (Adm Armando Lambruschini, 24 April 1979, addressing the Argentine Chamber of Construction).

"It is necessary to break a vicious circle which consists of the following

factors: lack of profitability because of scarce population; little settlement due to lack of growth; little growth due to lack of investment and little investment due to lack of profitability" (Description of the situation in Patagonia by the governor of Chubut during a meeting attended also by the governors of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego, LA RAZON, Buenos Aires, 8 April 1979).

What is Patagonia's Value?

In view of this situation, we may well ask ourselves "what has happened?" "why did we not do the job?" and above all, "what is to be done" as of now?

It is the purpose of this article to answer these questions but before we go any further we must make two major points: what we mean by what we call "the Argentine south" or "Patagonia"; and what our concept of "growth" is.

By the term "Argentine south" or "Patagonia" we mean the nation's land, sea, and air space extending south of the Rio Negro, up to the far insular sector east of the meridian of Cape Horn, including the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, Southern Sandwich Islands. It thus includes the provinces of Neuquen, Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, and the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic, and the South Atlantic Islands, excluding the Antarctic[1].

By "growth" we mean the overall development of the nation (or regions thereof), that is to say spiritual, social, and material growth. This is not just a definition relating to the concept of security[2] but rather includes the idea in a total concept. It constitutes the cultural foundation (in terms of its spiritual and economic components) which fashions the historical destiny of the national community. In this sense and looking at the economic aspects, it implies a change in structures and not just a simple quantitative increase.

II. Patagonia--Some Geopolitical Aspects

1. The National Geopolitical Boundary--Peninsular Argentina

Argentina extends from the confluence of the Mojinete and Grande de San Juan rivers, Cerro Branqui (Jujuy), all the way to the South Pole and from the Andes Mountain Range to the Atlantic Ocean. Wedged into the continent in the north through the northern part of Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay, it shares with Chile (a narrow country, long-drawn-out, with a difficult relief) the southernmost zone of South America. South of the line Mar del Plata--San Rafael--Curico--Conception (the latter two being located in Chile), we come to the continent's peninsular sector. Argentina is located along the so-called "Oceanic hemisphere" and is linked up with the rest of the world through the sea and through air space. Besides, Chile and Argentina, who face, respectively, toward the South

Pacific and the South Atlantic, are reaching out (via the sea), for geographic and historical reasons, upon the Antarctic continent, claiming sovereignty over specific sectors of that continent as a natural consequence.

In view of the situation described, looking at it from the viewpoint of the geopolitical situation, Argentina is "continental" bioceanic, and "Patagonic-Antarctic." The features mentioned here as a whole add up to what we call Peninsular Argentina[3].

This "peninsular Argentina" consists of two fundamental components: one of them is spatial and the other one is cultural.

Spatial Component (See Annex 1)

Our specifically continental homeland extends north of the line Mar del Plata (Buenos Aires)--San Rafael (Mendoza)[4]. This vast state has a border outline which is in intimate contact with the neighboring countries and an interior area with Cordoba as the epicenter.

South of that line, we have the peninsula in its more specific geographic sense; it reveals a transition zone and a Patagonic zone, separated by the general line San Antonio Oeste--Neuquen--National Highway No 22. In the transition zone, the areas in the western part of Mendoza and Neuquen constitute frontier zones while the eastern area is part of the concept of the operational shelf facing toward the sea.

Patagonia extends toward the insular sector (included) to the east of the meridian of Cape Horn. We might add that, due to geopolitical factors, all of Patagonia is a frontier. The same applies to the Argentina territorial waters and to the air space covering them. These latter two components are based upon and are supported by the land environment, although this is quite obvious. Hence, Patagonia constitutes the operational platform, so to speak, facing both of those areas and the Antarctic.

In this southern part of Patagonia we must note some special features. The Grand Island of Tierra del Fuego is separated from the continent by the Strait of Magellan (the passage between the Pacific and the Atlantic) which throughout its entire length, except for the eastern outlet (which is a part of Argentina) belongs to Chile; the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich, in the midst of the southern part of the Southwestern Atlantic are, respectively, 800, 2,400, and 3,000 kilometers away (measured along a straight line from Rio Gallegos to Puerto Stanley and the centers of both island groups); Puerto Natales (Chiles) is a satellite city of Rio Turbio; south of Grand Island of Tierra del Fuego, there are two other maritime communications links between the Pacific and the Atlantic; they are Beagle Channel and Drake Passage.

The Argentine Antarctic completes the space framework. It constitutes the far southern frontier of the country, the white frontier, separated from the continent by the southern area of the Southwestern Atlantic and the Antarctic Ocean, within which we find Scotia Sea, Weddell Sea, and Fleet Sea. The Antarctic Peninsula and the Southern Orkney Islands close the arc to the south (called the Southern Antilles) extending through the Southern Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, and the State Islands.

Cultural Component[5]

The cultural component constitutes the substance of the spatial boundary. National culture nurtures, consolidates, and strengthens the nation's power (in economic, political and military terms) and that power in turn generates the "creative social capacity." According to Toynbee, this ability is involved in coming up with adequate responses to the challenges which a society may face.

In this context, the economy is the base of the nation's material power, the support of its prosperity and spiritual development. It determines the country's real power, its sovereign capacity, and the level of its independence. In this sense, Peninsular Argentina's general objectives can be summarized in economic terms as follows: sector integration of production machinery; geoeconomic integration of nations; consolidation of national decision-making power. For this purpose it is necessary to apply the following overall priorities: economic infrastructure; promotion and development of basic sectors and industries; "internalization" of the development, expansion, and consolidation of the domestic market; national integration on top of regional integration.

Argentina's geopolitical undertaking however does not end with the material aspect of culture and economy. Its cornerstone can be summarized as follows: "On the organized and solidly integrated space, there must be settled a society without spiritual cracks between the various sectors constituting it and it must furthermore participate in the generation of the common good and the just distribution of the prosperity achieved."

To meet this objective, there is no alternative other than the peremptory organization of the nation's backbone as a whole. This decisive "action to be taken" must in turn be based on three pillars: the defense of moral and spiritual values; the defense, training, and development (both qualitative and quantitative) of its human resources; and, finally, the development and exploitation of all of its natural resources together with the optimum and ceaseless development of its production forces.

2. Patagonia--Geopolitical Importance

Covering almost one-fourth of Argentina's continental territory, the Patagonia covered in our article here takes up a large part of the "transition zone" and all of its specific area. The geopolitical relevance

springs not only from its size in terms of area but also from other factors which we will now outline.

A. In General, Its "Peninsular Character" and Relative Geographic Position

On the one side (to the east) it has a natural Atlantic location. On the other side (west), given the configuration of the "matching" country beyond the mountain range, it receives and projects influence from and upon the South Pacific. Chilean ports are suitable for the area, just as ports in Patagonia can be of interest to Chile. Some products of both countries can supplement each other and reciprocal trade turns out to be highly advantageous. The Andes Mountain Range even facilitates trade through its numerous passes and the relief, which "becomes gentle" as we go further south. Besides, it is particularly its southernmost part that constitutes the platform from which we project ourselves toward the Antarctic. On top of that, the southernmost sector is the guardian and custodian of the major interoceanic communications lines, such as the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, Drake Passage (between the Atlantic and the Pacific) and the southwestern approaches to the South Atlantic. Due to these circumstances, it constitutes the support base for naval power. From the viewpoint of air power, which is also based on its territory, it also constitutes a big base for the control of our own air space and for transpolar flights which undoubtedly will be regular routes in the future.

B. In Particular, the Following Aspects Must Be Emphasized and Detailed

(a) Natural resources which are very important, not only because of their categories and types but also because of their size in each particular case; they are on the other hand natural resources which are indispensable for an Argentina which has set itself the economic goal of sector and space integration[6]. Let us summarize them as follows:

Energy (in percentages for the country as a whole): petroleum (more than 60 percent); gas (more than 90 percent); coal (99 percent); hydroelectric power (40 percent).

Minerals (percentage of country as a whole): iron (70 percent); vanadium (50 percent); copper (33 percent); tungsten (30 percent); alunite (100 percent); sodium carbonate (100 percent); diatomaceous earth (90 percent); clay (80 percent); lead (15 percent); manganese (10 percent); kaolin (64 percent), and many others, such as uranium and gold.

Vast forest resources, highly suitable for industrial processing.

Continental shelf and ocean: protein and mineral resources, petroleum and flora suitable for industrial processing.

Broad possibilities for agricultural and livestock development, especially in the valleys of the mountain range. This could be further improved

through irrigation. In this respect, its great potential so far has been tapped only to the extent of 23 percent. Integral development would make it possible, in Patagonia, to produce for its own consumption and for surplus; on top of that, it would be possible to promote subsequent industrial development.

Parks, natural beauty, hot springs, etc., constituting the foundation for a tremendous domestic and international tourist industry.

(b) Importance of South Atlantic

It has increased tremendously in the last decade for various reasons. Let us mention the following in this connection: maritime traffic, which grew tremendously due to the construction of large vessels (especially petroleum tankers and mineral carriers) which cannot use the Suez and Panama canals. The first of these moreover, was out of commission for a long time due to the well-known problems in the Near East; next we have the economic importance springing from the fishing resources, in riverbeds and in the subsoil[7]; the young African nations which are playing an ever larger maritime role in the area. With relation to the figures given, we might add the military strategy aspects since naval operations by the superpowers have been stepped up considerably. In this respect, in case of a possible worldwide conflict, the South Atlantic would be an important theater of operations. Finally, we have the tremendous increase in air traffic, across the sea and the respective coastlines of Africa and Latin America.

(c) Southern Part of Southwestern Atlantic, Province of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego Governorate

The maritime space we are considering here extends from the 50° parallel South and is limited to the east by the 20° W meridian (the eastern boundary of the Inter-American reciprocal assistance treaty); to the west, by the meridian of Cape Horn and the coast of Patagonia; to the south, by the north shore of the Argentine Antarctic. It then touches the southern part of the Southwestern Atlantic and the Antarctic Ocean.

As a continental and peninsular space it includes the southern part (from the 50° parallel) of the province Santa Cruz and the Tierra del Fuego Governorate (with the exception of the Antarctic continental sector).

Looking at the strictly maritime space here, the latter is of tremendous economic value (hydrocarbons, minerals, fishing, and flora)[8] and it is also of extraordinary military strategic importance. In this sense we must emphasize that it constitutes the geographic continuity between contental Argentina and Argentina's share of Antarctica; it protects the entire maritime shoreline from the southern flank; it controls the approaches from the Pacific (Strait of Magellan, Beagle Channel, and Drake Passage) and from the Indian Ocean to the southwest of the ridge line marked by the Kerguelen, Crozet, and Prince Edward islands); it flanks

maritime traffic between Cape of Good Hope and the Bahia Blanca--Rio de Janeiro sector.

In this highly relevant maritime zone, Argentina can make only restricted use of its sovereignty due to the British presence and the differences with Chile (which will be covered later on); because of the challenge to the Argentine and Arctic sector by various powers and through the Antarctic Treaty, it is impossible, so long as this treaty is in force, to have bases or fortifications in that area, nor can any measures of a military nature be adopted (Article I, paragraph 1).

Looking at the continental-insular sector, there is an evident lack of overall development which influences its character as an operational base.

On top of that, land communications between the continent and Tierra del Fuego must be accomplished across Chilean territory and by ferry across the Strait of Magellan in the midst of that trans-Andean country. It goes without saying, in summary that, so long as the fragile economic-social structure continues to exist in the continental-insular part, the military strategic operational capacity is reduced.

3. Patagonia. Geopolitical Vulnerability

(a) Population vacuum--Chilean population present

In the vast expanses of this Patagonian part of Argentina (786, 983 square kilometers, there live about 700,000 inhabitants according to the details given in Table 1.

Table 1

1960		4	1970				1980 (1)
2 % Chilenos	3 Población	Provincia	3 Población	5 Densidad	2 Chilenos	2 % de Chilenos	3 Población
10	109 880	Neuquén	154 570	1,8	12 800	8,3	214 000
11,6	193 293	Río Negro	262 622	1,3	28 350	10	341 000
11,3	142 412	Chubut	189 930	0,8	17 930	9,4	234 000
30,5	52 908	Sta. Cruz	84 457	0,3	20 250	23,9	120 000
40,5	11 209	Tierra del Fuego (menos Antártida) 6	15 858	0,8	4 731	30,3	19 000
—	509 711	7 Total zona	707 237	0,9	82 071	—	928 000

Key: 1--Estimated population figure; 2--Chilean; 3--Population; 4--Province; 5--Density; 6--Minus Antarctic; 7--Zone total

that were pursued and carried out over the years. However, by some tragic irony, various series of "political objectives" and different "development plans" were drawn up along with high-sounding laws to promote industrial growth, foreign investments, etc.[11]

Everything that has to be said about Patagonia has been said. The time for action has come. It is not a coincidence that one of the periods of greater mobility with respect to the overall development of the area came in 1958-1961. At that time we had no plans on paper although we did have adequate promotion laws. But above all, there was determination and practical implementation capacity.

In concluding this chapter we must list the goals which, in the final analysis, derive from the voluminous written material and the lessons learned so far. We must also add some positive aspects which, in spite of the fact that nothing was done in general, did produce results in Patagonia. That will enable us to come up with some measure of optimism for the future if indeed we "put our shoulders to the wheel."

Need for Growth in Patagonia and Urgency of Task

"Regional planned and accelerated development" must now be implemented. "We have some negative items in our balance of payments and not even during the best harvest years will we be able to wipe out that deficit if we cannot rapidly and without hesitation replace all imported products which we can develop with our own national raw materials" (passage included in the document establishing the Northern Patagonia Corporation, 1955).

Patagonia integration constitutes an irrevocable historical duty. Populating it with Argentines is an urgent and priority task (from my article in ESTRATEGIA, 1969).

Looking at the various parts of the country, Patagonia is of primary and fundamental urgency (Second Five-Year Plan and Other Studies).

Priority, concurrent and complementary sectors (various studies).

Priority sectors: steel industry, metallurgy, petroleum, gas and coal, chemistry, petrochemistry, mining, electric power, fishing, refrigeration industry, textiles, forestry, food, and construction.

Complementary sectors: ports, maritime transportation, airports, railroads[12] and highways; agricultural and livestock production (including increase in irrigated areas).

Concurrent sectors: population policy and education policy; housing, urban development, and related problems.

Principal Action Methods (Various Studies)

National development centers; frontier zones and areas; promotion legislation; public and private (domestic and foreign) investments[13].

Aspects Specified or Considered of Major Significance

Hydroelectric power: Chocon-Cerros Colorados (distorted as regional development factor and behind schedule with respect to irrigation); Alicura project; studies on Alicopa; Florentino Ameghino Dam; Futaleufu dam.

Basic sectors: Hierro Patagonico de Sierra Grande S. A. [Incorporated]; ALUAR [Argentine Aluminum] (Aluminum); Soda Solvay (in the planning stage after almost 20 years of negotiation); construction of gas pipelines.

Centralized agencies: IDEVI (Lower Rio Negro Valley Development); Secretariat of Maritime Interests which will serve to foment the exploitation of the sea, speed up the improvement ports, and promote maritime traffic from the area and other related activities.

Other aspects: air service (see Annex 2); road construction projects (Annex 3); communications (radio and telecommunications, see Annex 4)[14].

Regional advancement: current legislation on Tierra del Fuego.

Civil action by the armed forces, especially the navy, through shipments to Patagonia; the air force, support and incentive for LADE [State Airlines]; and the army, through the mission assigned to V Corps including the bridges across the Las Vueltas River (Santa Cruz) and the Andacollo Bridge (Neuquen).

The studies drafted and carried out by some political and business personalities, including the owners and managers of mass communications media, as well as intellectuals, teachers in Patagonia, and the Salesian congregation[15].

(.) Foreign Pressure on Patagonia

This aspect is one of the chapters which, although well known, requires special recapitulation. We would like to note however right away that this study need not be confined only to external pressure because there is another kind of pressure, as serious or even more serious, which we must take up in the following chapter. This involves the pressure coming from foreign groups and interests and their agents as well as their domestic allies who proposed to the country a production machinery that would specialize in agribusiness (processed foods), as part of a new international division of labor.

Let us now summarize the foreign pressure.

From Chile. This country on the other side of the Andes is acting upon Argentina's Patagonia in various ways. We have already mentioned one natural way which involves its population pressure. Its population surplus crosses the mountain range, either to settle down on Argentine territory or to participate in "seasonal" activities (sheep-shearing season or fruit harvest). In this sense, the Chilean percentage figures in the various provinces do not tell the whole truth. First of all, because there are people who elude our censuses. Secondly, we have the case of the areas closest to the borders. My experience has enabled me to collect some statistics which I would now like to present here: areas in Santa Cruz, close to the border with Chile, where 80 percent of the population are Chilean. Or we have the case of Turbio which should be a matter of serious concern in view of elementary factors of national security. There we not only have a high percentage of Chileans but this is especially true inside the enterprise [Empresa] which turns Puerto Natales into a satellite city of Turbio. Other aspects of this pressure are not natural but derive from political decisions perfectly worked out and pursued with the utmost perseverance. They are the results of an idea which originally was a rather strong one but which unfortunately now has turned into a powerful obsession. I am talking about the Chilean geopolitical concept to the effect that their country is geopolitically squeezed in between the mountain range and the Pacific Ocean. This situation, they conclude, means that they must take action to break this "encirclement" which means that they must advance upon Patagonia and have sectors of their own in the South Atlantic. Any means is proper in the pursuit of that goal, from action in the big international forums (carried out with noteworthy constancy and suitability) all the way to the specific events I am mentioning here. In this connection I must first of all stress as a political attitude the pressure that is being exerted through the radio and, next, the territorial claims as such.

Radio Broadcasting

The use of radio broadcasting is an important element in influencing the spiritual portion of our culture. The Chilean radio stations (see Annex 5), especially from Santiago all the way to the south, cover the entire area of Patagonia, especially during the peak listening hours, by virtue of their output and frequencies. The content of their programs serve to achieve political and artistic penetration. Their respective programs go far beyond supporting the loyalty of their fellow citizens and serve some specific purposes. During the last months of last year (1978), this happened for instance during the Beagle crisis. During that time, there was a daily and ceaseless stream of criticism and there were even some ironic allusions to Argentina's attitude. Thus the radio is used to supplement a perfectly executed national strategy.

Territorial Aspects--The Beagle Case[1]

Patagonia and the South Atlantic constituted the fundamental objective of Chilean expansion. That is where there were possibilities for a population that was difficult to hold back on a territory which, covering an area of [illegible] square kilometers, only has a potentially productive surface of [illegible],000 square kilometers--not enough for normal population growth. Besides, the vast shoreline of Patagonia facing toward the South Atlantic and the presence of the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, and Drake Passage promoted the traditional aspiration of definitely breaking the "geopolitical encirclement." Argentina would thus be harmed. For this purpose, they engaged in intrusions and squatter settlement in border areas, under the protection of "Argentina's lack of concern for the frontier regions." This de facto occupation many times culminated in jurisdictional claims. They also claimed sovereignty over Patagonia south of the Diamante River and in the course of the negotiations Argentina finally lost the Strait of Magellan although Argentina did retain ownership of its eastern outlet and, on Grand Island off Tierra del Fuego we did hold to the current meridian of its western boundary with the neighboring country, up to the Beagle Channel. The Treaty of 1881 and its Additional Protocol of 1893 constituted the end of those discussions one of whose aspects--the Oceanic principle--was ratified in one of the protocols of 1893. Those documents however do not explicitly spell out some aspects, referring only to what remained south of the Beagle Channel; that opened the way in the area for a series of incidents and controversies which later on were submitted to the Government of Britain for arbitration (July 1971).

Let us summarize the various positions.

Chile: the oceanic principle is valid only north of the arc of Grand Island of Tierra del Fuego; Staten Island; Beagle Channel; it runs along the [illegible] Island of Tierra del Fuego. Its eastern outlet is between the Lennox and Nueva Island. Inside the channel, the islands belong to it. For which purpose it advocated the thesis of the "dry coast": all islands south of said channel belong it. In support of its theses regarding the oceanic principle it argued before specialized world organizations that the Pacific Ocean "entered" or extended all the way to the arc of the Southern Antilles.

Argentina: Oceanic principle, determined by the true boundary between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which is the meridian of Cape Horn; Beagle Channel, runs around Navarino Island (Chile) all the way to the north of Lennox Island; Nueva and Picton [islands] belong to it because they are to the south of that island and because they are Atlantic islands. Inside

the Beagle Channel there must be a boundary line which will make it possible to sail through its own waters, as well as sovereign control over the rocks, islands, and islets to the north and east of that boundary line; Lennox and all of the other islands remaining to the east of the meridian of Cape Horn belong to it because they are Atlantic islands. The same is true of the eastern side of Horn Island.

The British Court announced its ruling in May 1977 and the juridical flaws and contradictions in that ruling caused Argentine to reject it on 25 January 1978. During that period of time and thereafter, we had a succession of bilateral conversations and negotiations whose failure, due to the obstinacy of the Chilean government, pushed both sides to the brink of an armed conflict. In the meantime, Chile not only declared that it owned all of the islands south of the Beagle Channel (based on the ruling rejected by Argentina) through the Decree of the straight base line (August 1977), but also claimed sovereignty over the sea (South Atlantic), within a radius of 200 miles to the south and east of that line. During the negotiations it also tried to claim ownership over the eastern outlet of the Strait of Magellan (which was rejected), in which case it would then also claim a corresponding strip of 200 miles to the east of that outlet.

Right now (May 1979), following intervention by the Vatican, bilateral negotiations were resumed in Rome. His Holiness John Paul II, represented by His Eminence Cardinal Antonio Samore, provided "conciliation assistance" between the parties. Although this encouraged optimism for a suitable solution it did on the other hand not guarantee that an agreement would be arrived at--especially since both Chile and Argentina retained their freedom of action to resolve the situation once and for all in accordance with their respective interests.

This is the time to stress two aspects above all: first of all, Argentina's fundamental interests in this issue; next, while the Chilean position, from the current geopolitical viewpoint, may be reasonable, its claims lack any and all legal, historical, and geographic foundation.

Argentina's fundamental interests can be explained in the following manner: in general, to preserve the validity of the Oceanic Principle, with a dividing line running along the meridian of Cape Horn. In particular, to have our own navigable waters in the Beagle Channel; navigation through the remaining channels; ownership of islands which guarantee Argentina's right to the respective maritime jurisdiction; adequate safeguards against any projection into the Antarctic which would affect Argentina's sovereignty sector on that continent.

The safeguarding of these interests thus becomes the primary objective of Argentina's national policy for the area in question. For this purpose, the negotiations in Rome constitute only a phase of the problem. Even if the results are favorable, one decisive task remains to be accomplished:

to assert Argentina's presence through development. While maintaining the boundary line that we inherited from our ancestors is an important objective, it is even more important to control the frontier running from that boundary and definitely supporting and sustaining it.

Regarding Chilean geopolitics in the area of the Beagle Channel, we said in another study that this is a big mistake by the specialists and the administration of the country on the other side of the Andes. We might also add that "they cannot see the forest for the trees." Chile will attain the objective it pursues so tenaciously not at the expense of Argentina but with Argentina. In agreement with that statement we maintain that the definite breakup of this encirclement will be possible only through true cooperation of a general nature between both countries, sustained by the spirit that moved those who signed the Oceanic Principle. This will do away with 19th-century geopolitical concepts which are now outdated.

Great Britain in the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the Southern Sandwich Islands[17]

This is an old trouble spot which goes back to the plunder perpetrated by Great Britain in 1833. This is a fundamental problem for Argentina's present and future. Its solution therefore is extremely urgent. The continued hold of the intruder here affects not only our unquestionable rights but also the geostrategic control of the area and the economic interests because of the wealth found here in terms of fishing, mineral deposits on the continental shelf, and the hydrocarbons in the ocean subsoil.

Negotiations toward a concrete solution were reopened in February 1977 and various meetings were held between Argentine and British delegations in different "neutral" foreign cities. But it seems that little progress has been made, not only because of the complicated nature of the problem but also because of British domestic political issues. On top of that we have the interests aroused in krill and particularly in petroleum and gas in the Malvinas [Falkland Islands] Basin.

During the discussions, the issue boiled down to an equation consisting of two terms: sovereignty--economic cooperation. Argentina established a point of departure and that was the matter of sovereignty. It then agreed "to talk" about the kind of cooperation which might help ease the economic and social situation of the islanders. Great Britain, on the other hand, has been stressing economic cooperation in spite of the fact that the issue, as recommended by the United Nations, involves sovereignty over the islands. In summary, we view Great Britain's position as one of simple exchange. Ironic though it may seem, London is trying to obtain maximum economic advantages before deciding to return the island group to its legitimate owner. And it is the latter who supposedly "should" accept "ransome payment" for what was taken from him 150 years ago.

With respect to this problem we have been maintaining that Argentina must not yield in the matter of sovereignty, nor must it make it dependent upon economic cooperation. The negotiations will therefore be slow and cumbersome. There will be progress and there will be setbacks. Great Britain may insist on not returning the islands or it may confuse the issue for the same reason. But it is working against time because, if we pull Argentina together, time is on our side. At any rate, Argentina must not drop its guard. We must insist on a peaceful solution without however ruling out the extreme alternative. The latter therefore calls upon us to prepare the best possible strategic conditions.

Pressures on Argentine Territorial Waters

A series of pressures, both legal and political as well as military and economic is being applied to this vast state. We might mention the most important ones now: the Sea Law Conference which, among other topics on its agenda, includes the definition of the territorial limits (12 miles), the economic limits (188 miles) and sovereignty over the shelf and the subsoil (now under discussion). This involves not only maritime countries but others who do not hold such a position and some which have limitations with respect to that[18]. Of course, when these questions have been defined, Argentina's own legislation will have to be adjusted in accordance; secret fishing activities by many countries interested in the protein wealth of Argentine waters; the growing military importance of the South Atlantic which has led to stepped-up naval and air activities by the super powers and the big power in this part of the world; the very probable advance of the African states, especially those directly linked with the South Atlantic, such as South Africa, Angola, and, within a short time, Namibia; finally, we have Brazil which claims a responsibility in the South Atlantic which ranges from monopoly all the way to leadership.

The importance of Patagonia's continental-insular area emerges clearly against the background of pressures in this sector. We said--and we must repeat here--that all of it constitutes the operational platform, the base of support for the naval and air components which operate in this important part of Argentine territorial waters. Hence, its overall development assumes unavoidable national priorities.

III. Factors Postponing Patagonian Integration[19]

Since 1907, men from various sectors and governments of various origins have been planning the development of this vast area and today we still struggle with this same problem, so that the moment seems to have come to point up the causes, which in our judgment, prevented this situation from being resolved.

In this connection there is no doubt that there was a complex range of factors that influenced the situation negatively. Nevertheless, there are two factors which turn out to be key factors; one is internal and the other one is external and both of them are closely interconnected.

the first one, the internal one, as a consequence of the scheme which was adopted at the end of the last century and under which Argentina is part of an international division of labor where it must supply the industrialized countries with food and raw materials in return for manufactured products and fuel. The country therefore concentrated above all on its coastal prairie and, starting with the two world wars, the development of light industry, which was established particularly in that area, further accentuated this national distortion. On the one hand, it produced internal migration toward the big cities along the shore, especially in the area of Greater Buenos Aires. On the other hand, it made the country more dependent on foreign fuel, investments, and capital goods. The interior was neglected and entire areas were left to their fate. On top of these circumstances there was an external factor. It involves the big international interests and their domestic agents who promoted and who benefited from this model. In economic terms, they did this by supplying from abroad what the country could have produced at home and what it could have thus substituted, in other words, the country could have stopped purchasing these items abroad but that would have meant that they would lose their commission as middlemen. In political terms, which may be of secondary significance here and where there are no major possibilities at this time, they did so by accentuating Patagonia's isolation with a view to its future segregation, yesterday (Great Britain and Chile) or its weakening today, in order to obtain better conditions in support of territorial claims (Chile) or for the exploitation of the southern waters (Great Britain and the big European powers).

Looking at the problem from this angle which we outlined above, it is not surprising that Patagonia has so far been overlooked and neglected and has fundamentally been used for the production of raw materials, including wool and certain food products, such as fruits, truck-gardening vegetables, etc. At best, there might have been some promotion of some basic sectors which would serve the colonial agents here.

But is it surprising that the entire process of developing Patagonia, which threatens the "status quo" was obstructed and delayed indefinitely, restricted, distorted, or simply cancelled out. This applies not only to projects springing from private initiative but also to those of government origin.

How the Interests Tied to the "Status Quo" Work

The aspects outlined above would be incomplete if we were not to mention some methods used by those interests in attaining their objectives. This list is far from exhaustive.

From Abroad

Working on the international financing organizations or private investors in order to hinder or delay the funds necessary or to grant them under

conditions advantageous to their interests. The practice of demanding numerous studies is a common method designed to delay solutions.

Exerting pressure on the national government through other governments and international organizations.

Creating false images through suitable publicity campaigns and communications media.

In this connection, the following are common:

Negative or distorted image of government, groups, or persons who provide impetus for growth to the extent that the latter would affect their interests;

Good or outstanding image or promotion of groups and persons who consciously or unconsciously advocate ideas or draft plans in line with their objectives.

Selling at "dumping" prices to demonstrate that domestic production is uneconomical and inefficient or is not in line with "international prices."

Promoting, stimulating, and financing institutions which in their respective countries pursue ideas related to their interests. This operation extends all the way to Argentina where they are financing or subsidizing institutions which directly or indirectly promote ideas along those lines.

Domestically

Psychological action campaigns against those who propose theories, who draw up plans, or who carry out projects in conflict with the interests of the status quo.

Denying growth possibilities due to inadequate or insufficient natural or financial resources.

Infiltrating their own agents and functionaries into the policy and strategy planning agencies or into government executive agencies. That also includes promoting people to high posts who intellectually agree with their objectives.

Creating "diversions," normally, political and social diversions, resorting even to the use of professional agitators.

Exploiting tendencies of sound although formal nationalism in order to prevent the effective development of essential sectors. This is true of petroleum where certain ideas were used to keep the country dependent on imports to the benefit of the big international monopolies.

promoting economic policy theories, doctrines, and themes directly or through institutions or agents who promote foreign interests. Here we might mention some which are being given full publicity, such as:

The nation has lost its historical relevance;

"Nation-continent" projects in close connection with regional integration and the loss of effectiveness of the concept of nation;

Regional integration without prior national integration;

Declare the completion of the phase of replacing imports by shifting emphasis to efficiency and economy in order "to compete with international prices"; this in turn is tied in with the following:

Elimination of protection for industry through customs duty reductions;

Implementation of "interference projects," that is to say, projects which interfere with other projects or which, after they have been approved, are not carried out;

Stirring up political conflicts.

The Real Options

The development of Patagonia is tied to the project of the nation. In this sense, any project or any long-term undertaking, which is designed to consolidate the old scheme or which, in fact, signifies the continuation of the status quo, will once again push Patagonia aside, along with other disadvantaged regions.

With respect to these ideas, there are basically two models which are currently being debated:

(a) A country oriented toward the outside world, with maximum development in the "wet prairie" and some "islands" in the rest of the national territory as such, producing essentially raw materials and processed foods. An industrial machinery which generally will specialize in sectors deriving from agricultural and livestock production and some basic sectors, preferably fertilizer petrochemistry; this is what is usually called "agribusiness." That brings up the need for "opening up the economy," a modern version of the old batter ideology[20];

(b) A country put together as a nation, integrated in geoeconomic and social terms; in other words, a scheme that would incorporate into the nation the areas which today are ignored and disadvantaged, such as Patagonia, the Northwest, and the Misiones panhandle; this would also include the accelerated development of basic sectors and industries (mining, steel industry, petrochemistry, aluminum, cellulose, etc.) and the service infrastructure, with a high and sustained average population income.

This last economic model is designed to bring about self-sustained and independent growth on the basis of a big domestic production and consumption market. This adds up to an industrial society which will join the international market as such with its subsequent changes in the structure of its foreign trade.

The first of these models--which some authors have called "unintegrated and open" or "agribusiness"--relegates the importance of the domestic market to a secondary position, underestimates the value of basic industries as support sectors, as the source for the growth of other sectors, such as agriculture and animal husbandry as well as the light industry, and accentuates the foreign market through traditional products and a specialized industry which does not require heavy capital and technology investments, such as the leather industry, processed foods, etc.

It might seem obvious here to add that the "agribusiness" model, based on the idea of "opening Argentina's economy," not only is not in keeping with the needs of Argentine society during its current stage of economic, social, and cultural development, but even denies the possibilities of adequate national security and, worse than that, the political future and the destiny of grandeur for Argentina. As far as Patagonia and the presently depressed areas are concerned, this would once again doom them to become the colonial areas of the other Argentina, the Argentina of the port of Buenos Aires and its immediate zone of influence.

IV. Conclusions

1. Last 100 years after its conquest, Patagonia has not yet been effectively and totally integrated into the national community. Moreover, it constitutes the country's most vulnerable frontier area, not only because of its population vacuum, but also because of the external pressures to which its vast environment is subject. Its development is unavoidable for a totally organized Argentina which, in the economic area, seeks its sector and space integration and, in general terms, an optimum level of national power (political-economic-military and psychosocial).

2. The fundamental cause of this critical situation is economic-social underdevelopment which generally characterizes the region. This level is, in particular, a consequence of a national economic policy geared toward agricultural exports which, from the end of the last century on, has been giving preference to the agricultural and livestock sector and the wet prairie, to the detriment of the other key aspects of the country's production machinery and interior. This policy was promoted, encouraged, supported, and exploited by domestic and foreign interests which were objectively allied and which operated hand in hand.

3. This economic profile, which made the country a supplier of raw materials in food, in a world characterized by international division of labor, still persists today in a modern version: Argentina is supposed to specialize in agribusiness. Under this system, we would add, to the

previous model, the processing of food, the promotion of any sector connected with the growth of agricultural and livestock output and its best possible storage and transportation to overseas markets. In summary, a new wrapping for the same old package. Based on the presumed virtues of the "opening up of the economy," this scheme would doom us to perpetuating the traditional role of food supplier for countries with a high level of industrial development. A further aggravating factor would be, in the area of the Southern Cone, that Brazil, on its own and because it has been so selected by big international interests, would belong to this latter category.

Uniting Patagonia with the rest of the nation is a historical duty and a national necessity which cannot be postponed any longer. The extremely urgent character of this task springs from the situation described above. But this is also necessary in view of the possibility that, in the future, if the current situation continues, we will not have an opportunity--as we have now--to try to correct a new negative balance, nor will we even have a chance to formulate any further self-criticism.

Patagonia's economic-social development springs from clear objectives and well-defined urgencies. They have been pointed up in a large number of public and private documents. We summarized them throughout this article, grouping them according to priorities, supplementary factors, and parallel factors. In this respect, we must emphasize the first of these: steel industry, metallurgy, petroleum, gas, coal, chemistry, petrochemistry, mining, electric power, fishing, refrigeration industry, textiles, forestry, foods, and construction.

However, this regional economic development will be nothing but a simple intention without a national economic policy which in general terms pursues identical objectives. In this sense, we must meet two fundamental prerequisites, that is to say:

First of all, we must put an end to the idea of "having to specialize" in "agribusiness" which however does not mean that we disregard its importance and that we would, by way of substitution, promote a medium-term and long-term economic model featuring an "integrated economy" which must be viewed in sector terms, starting with basic sectors and industries, and in spatial terms, in the sense of "internalizing" our development primarily by promoting the frontier region.

Secondly: paralleling this economic policy with a firm determination for implementation and the capacity to do so, the aptitude to carry it out; strategy is policy in action--the two sides of one and the same coin; if one of them fails, so will the other one, in spite of the best intentions.

In conclusion let us recall the timeliness of a statement contained in a letter from one of our great civilian leaders, Mr Exequiel Ramos Mexia to General Roca: "The conquest of the desert by force of arms, which you have accomplished, is not complete: we must add the civilian conquest to it."

I believe the moment has come for us, once and for all, to put our shoulders to the wheel. Let us celebrate the Centenary of what our ancestors accomplished but let us initiate and support the second and real conquest so that the year 2000 will find us as a nation that will truly be the master of its fate. The time has come to act. Let us make sure that those who come after us will tomorrow be able to celebrate what we have built for them.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Antarctic was excluded because of its special problem complex. But its future importance and the natural protection of Patagonia stand out just the same, in particular, south of the parallel of Comodoro Rivadavia; the Argentine sector of the frozen continent is another challenge to the people of Argentina.

2. We might mention the following concept here: "In a society which is becoming modernized, security means growth. Security does not just refer to the military establishment, although it may include it; security is not military force although it may include it; security is not traditional military activity, although it may include it. Security is growth and without growth there cannot be any security" (Robert McNamara, as secretary of defense of the United States, Montreal, 18 May 1966).

3. In contrast to the concept of Adm Segundo R. Storni who used the geopolitical concept of "Insular Argentina."

4. Other geopolitical aspects and details of Argentina may be seen in the collection of my geopolitical articles entitled "Geopolitica del Cono Sur," El CID, Publishers, Buenos Aires, February 1979.

5. Culture is man's ability to act upon himself and upon nature. Man cultivates himself and with the instruments he creates and he also modifies the outside world under certain circumstances involving space and environment. These latter two factors constitute the nation. National culture is the result of a process in which the standards of universal culture are assimilated or enriched by the native components. National culture, as a frontier, has two dimensions--the spiritual dimension which covers the following components: science, ethics, intellectual area, esthetics, religion, social-political patterns, life style; the material dimension which improves technology, production methods and economic systems. External interests work on both of these spheres and "pressure is exerted" upon society. This is done in the spiritual sphere particularly through the mass communications media and education. In the material or economic sphere this is done in various ways; but in general this is accomplished by infiltrating agents on the higher levels of economic

management who then carry out real psychosocial operations (which take effect in the spiritual sphere) in order to given them the proper ideological brand. Savio said: "Economic pressure is stronger than the pressure of war. It is not cruel but it is implacable and integral." We say that "for anybody who wants to dominate, cultural subjugation constitutes the less cruel victory because it does not require bloodshed, nor does it require an occupation force since the native is turned into the docile instrument of the alien cause."

6. This objective is almost always spelled out on paper but it is not fully carried out. In military terms we can say that time, orders, and supervision are lacking.

7. The Argentine geologist Sebastian Pocovi, in a study published in ESTRATEGIA, No 49/50, November-December 1977, and January-February 1978, estimates the total potential of all of the basins in our underwater shelf at something like 32 billion cubic meters of petroleum.

8. We recommend reading the "Schakleton Report," published in ESTRATEGIA, as Document No 1, Buenos Aires, 1976, and the article by Sebastian Pocovi, mentioned earlier.

9. Argentine and Chilean population statistics in Argentina were taken from the 1970 census and other official documents consulted. The figures on Chilean population settlement, estimated that same year, were taken from "Geografia Economica de Chile," Production Development Corporation, Santiago de Chile, 1967.

10. As an example to give the reader a comparative idea we must mention the case of the Province of Santa Cruz and Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) and Northern Ireland which are similar in size; the former covers 243,943 square kilometers and the latter cover 244,045 square kilometers. The resources of the former do not fall far short of those of the latter and the same is true of their respective levels of industrial development. The United Kingdom has a population of 55,850,000 at this time which gives it a population density of 229 inhabitants per square kilometer

11. See, in this respect, ESTRATEGIA, No 3, September-October 1969, the article by Enrique Vera Villalobos, entitled "Plans for the Promotion of Patagonia." Also consult the bibliography on Patagonia, published by the Southern University, Bahia Blanca; the Ramos Mejia plan, and the report of the Bailey Willis Commission; the Second Five-Year Plan (January 1953--December 1957); the regional promotion legislation between 1958 and 1963, in particular, Law No 14.781 and Decree 6130/61; 10.561/61; 2320/62, 23.351/62 and 5338/63 and 5339/63; "Analisis Regional de la Patagonia" (preliminary version, Vols I and II, Federal Investment Council, Neuquen, 1966); "Patagonia Development Plan," Academy of Sciences, Buenos Aires, 1966, with the second part containing an important study entitled "Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego--

Action Plan for the Development of Its Basic Infrastructure and Fundamental Factors in Its Economic-Social Integration," by Adm Gregorio A. Portillo; legislation on frontier zones and areas. For my part, I concerned myself extensively with this topic. The reader may refer to ESTRATEGIA, No 3, mentioned earlier, an article entitled "Interests Linked to the Status Quo Postponed Integration of Patagonia," which is updated and completed in this study, and "Guidelines for Drafting the Development Plan, 1971-1975," "Proposal for Short-Term and Medium-Term Economic Policy," included in my book entitled "120 dias en el Gobierno" (Buenos Aires, 1971, first edition, page 69). This document was used in drafting--under the direction of Engineer Pedro Gortari, who took over CONADE [National Development Council], following my resignation, the development plan project entitled "National Development and Security Plan, 1971-1975--Medium-Term Goals" (three volumes, December 1970). All of these documents provided the immediate background for the final "National Development and Security Plan for 1971-1975" whose drafting was directed by Javier Villanueva, at that time the new secretary of CONADE, who was also concerned with the development of Patagonia. The reader should also consult the "Plan Trienal para la Reconstruccion y la Liberacion Nacional 1974/1977" and the foreign industry and investments promotion legislation of that period of time and the current administration.

12. Various studies consider it necessary to complete the southern section across the Andes, to update the Ramos Mejia plan, and to build the railroad across Patagonia.

13. The national centers, and the frontier zones and areas, have been spelled out in various studies and there is basic agreement here. Among the former we have the Zapalla valley of the Negro River; Puerto Madryn-Sierra Grande--Trelew; Comodoro Rivadavia; Rio Gallegos --El Turbio; frontier areas: Rio Senguerr; Chos Mal; Corcovado; Rio Chico; Calafate; Epuyen; Junin de los Andes (frontier areas, see Decree No 469, 30 January 1970).

14. Annex 2 is from the work by Raul Larra, "La conquista aerea del Desierto," Anfora Publishers, Buenos Aires, 1979; Annex 3 was supplied by the Directorate-General of Highways; Annexes 4 and 5 were prepared on the basis of studies supplied by Brig Gen Alberto Vicente Nieto, Ret., former secretary of communications, and Col Eduardo J. Barbieri, Ret., the current interventor of COMFER [Federal Broadcasting Council].

15. I would, with special cordiality, recall Felipe Sapag, former governor of Neuquen; Dr Jose Enrique Gadano, former national senator for Rio Negro, now deceased; and Mr Miguel Aidar, former national deputy for Santa Cruz and businessman in that province, who collaborated with very important articles in ESTRATEGIA, No 3.

16. See also ESTRATEGIA, No 46, September-October 1977, among other articles, mine entitled "The Southern Area of the Southwestern Atlantic, Chile's Geopolitics, and the Beagle Ruling"; and, in ESTRATEGIA, No 49/50, "The Beagle Issue--Direct Negotiations or Dialogue with Weapons"; for the overall situation regarding Argentina's frontiers, see ESTRATEGIA, No 37/38, January-February 1976, "Argentina--National Policy and Frontier Policy--National Crisis and Frontier Problems," written by me. All of these studies can be consulted in the previously mentioned "Geopolitica del Cono Sur."

17. For further data, see the Shackleton report mentioned earlier and ESTRATEGIA, No 43/44, January-February 1977, my article entitled "Negotiations on the Malvinas in a New Stage?"

18. See ESTRATEGIA, No 40/41, May-August 1976, and ESTRATEGIA, No 54, September-October 1978, articles by Capt Roberto M. Orstein, "Argentina's Position on the Law of the Sea" and Ernesto de la Guardia, "Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea--Situation and Prospects," respectively.

19. This paragraph is quoted almost verbatim from my article entitled "Interests Connected to the Status Quo Postpone Patagonian Integration," mentioned earlier. Written in 1969, it still applies today.

20. This is being promoted from the outside by the big multinationals, particularly the "trilateral commission," which is guided by the Rockefeller group.



[Caption to Annex 1 on following page]

[See figure on preceding page]

Annex 1. Peninsular Argentina.

Key: 1--Continental-peninsular boundary; 2--Geopolitical protection; 3--Peninsular-continental seam zone; 4--Patagonia: operational platform pointing toward the sea and the Antarctic (the eastern part of the seam zone must also be included in the frontier zone and as part of said platform; 5--Argentine territorial waters; 6--National development center; 7--Frontier zone; 8--Geopolitical triangle.

[See figure on following page]

Annex 2. Regular Airline Routes of LADE, Argentine and Southern Airlines, which today (1978) cover a vast region that was the desert of the Pampa and Patagonia (authorized partial reproduction of a map in the book by Commodore Juan Jose Guiraldes, "El poder aereo de los argentinos," Buenos Aires, 1979).


SAN RAFAEL
BUENOS AIRES
MONTEVIDEO
LA PLATA
SANTA ROSA
VILLA GESELL
MAR DEL PLATA
BAHIA BLANCA
NEUQUEN
ZAPALA
APELCO
VIEDMA
BARILOCHE
SIERRA GRANDE
EL BOLSON
EL MAITEN
TRELEW
ESQUEL
SAN MARTIN
R. SENGUERR
R. MAYO
C. RIVADAVIA
P. MORENO
PTO. DESEADO
G. GREGORES
S. JULIAN
ARGENTINO
STA. CRUZ
RIO GALLEGOS
PTO. STANLEY
RIO GRANDE
USHUAIA

Annex 1. Medium-Term Work Plan of the National Highway Directorate (Southern Region), April 1979

(This plan was made available by that agency with the remark that these schemes "remain subject to works project planning and the determination of priorities resulting as a function of the budget availabilities during the next several physical years.")

Provice of Neuquen

New Projects

Highway No 22: boundary along Rio Negro--access to the airport of Neuquen --two-lane (this project includes the new bridge over the Neuquen River and the access road to the airport)--length 9 kilometers;

Junction with access road to Neuquen airport--Plottier--basic construction work and surfacing--length 22 kilometers;

Highway No 40: Chos Malal--boundary with Mendoza--basic construction work and surfacing--length 132 kilometers;

Southern junction, Huitrin-Zapala, missing sections, length 120 kilometers.

Reconstruction Work

Highway No 40: Zapala--La Rinconada--resurfacing, widening, changes in layout and new bridge across Picun-Leufu River, length 215 kilometers;

Highway No 22: Arroyito--Zapala--resurfacing and widening--length 135 kilometers.

Province of Rio Negro

New Projects

Highway No 22: Cipolletti--boundary with Neuquen--basic construction work and two lanes surfaced--length 2.4 kilometers (including junction of highway No 22 with highway No 151, 5 kilometers long).

Chichinales--Cipolletti--basic construction work and lane surfaced--length 110 kilometers;

Highway No 152: La Japonesa--junction with highway No 22--new layout--basic construction work and surfacing--length 47 kilometers;

Highway No 258: Lake Guillermo--boundary with Chubut--basic construction work, surfacing, and bridges--length 93 kilometers;

Highway No 23: junction with highway 1--Valcheta--basic construction work and surfacing--length 75 kilometers;

Reconstruction Work

Highway No 22: Rio Colorado--Choele-Choel--resurfacing and widening the surface--length 138 kilometers;

Choele-Choel--Villa Regina--resurfacing--length 135 kilometers

Province of Chubut

New Projects

Highway No 3: northern access to Comodoro Rivadavia--two-lane--length 5 kilometers;

Highway No 25: Las Chapas--Las Plumas--basic construction work and surfacing--length 48 kilometers;

Highway No 40: Lelequ--Esquel (completion of missing portions)--length 36 kilometers;

Tecka--Gobernador Costa--basic construction work, surfacing, and bridges--length 80 kilometers;

Rio May--boundary with Santa Cruz--basic construction work, surfacing, and bridges--length 38 kilometers;

Highway No 258 and turnpike: boudary with Rio Negro--Leleque--basic construction work and surfacing--length 70 kilometers.

Reconstruction Work

Highway No 3: boundary with Rio Negro--Trelew--length 140 kilometers.

Province of Santa Cruz

New Projects

Highway No 3: Fitz Roy--Comandante Piedrabuena--improvement of basic construction work and surface--length 385 kilometers, public bidding invitations on contracts (5 sections awarded);

Highway No 40: boundary with Chubut--Perito Moreno--basic construction work and surfacing--length 78 kilometers;

El Cerrito--Tapi Aike--basic construction work and surfacing with gravel --length 70 kilometers;

Highway No 291: Cuer Aiko--Rio Turbio--basic construction work and gravel surfacing--length 172 kilometers.

Reconstruction Work

Highway No 3: Caleta Olivia--Fitz Roy--resurfacing and widening--length 75 kilometers;

Comandante Piedrabuena--Rio Gallegos--resurfacing and widening--length 117 kilometers.

National Territory of Tierra Del Fuego

New Projects

Highway No 3: bridges over the Northern Ewans and Southern Ewans river and access roads;

Bridge over Pipo Creek and access roads;

[illegible] Cotorras--Grande Creek--basic construction work, gravel, and construction of two bridges.

Complementary highway B--bridges over the Mac Lennan, Mendez, and Candelaria rivers.

Annex .. Telecommunications in Patagonia

(See three sketches)

From the viewpoint of telecommunications, Patagonia is integrated into the nation primarily through an extensive network of high-power radio electric (microwave) relay facilities consisting of two main trunk lines converging in the zone of Bahia Blanca (see sketch 1).

This intercity network, which is used for telephone, telegraph, and telex traffic, as well as for carrying radio broadcasting signals (sound and television) in the region of Patagonia, will be expanded and modernized as part of a medium-term plan (5 years). Plans drafted so far call for an appreciable increase in the capacity and reliability of existing telecommunications facilities and for the connection to the system of those zones which currently have little or nothing in the way of communications media. The intercity section from Bahia Blanca to Comodoro Rivadavia will be completely replaced in view of its technical obsolescence by a high-power radio network (900 telephone channels plus television) with high reliability (reserve radio electric channel, solid-state components, etc.); this, on top of the third radioelectric line which will be added to the existing Comodoro Rivadavia--Usuhaia section, will technologically update the Atlantic trunk line.

In addition to these replacements and completion projects, the regional telecommunications development plan includes the connections for Calafate and Perito Moreno to the Bahia Blanca--Ushuaia subsystem by means of high-power radio links and carrier-wave systems going to Pto. Madryn--Trelew, Trelew--Rawson, and Rio Gallegos--Rio Turbio.

Looking at the Bahia Blanca--San Carlos de Bariloche subsystem, its reliability will be improved through the addition of a third radioelectric channel and the extension of its broadcasting area through new radio links: Esquel--San Carlos de Bariloche, Esquel--El Corcovado, Neuquen--Barda Chica, Pilcaniyeu--Ing. Jacobacci and Zapala--Chos Malal. What we have said so far pertains to the intercity network of Patagonia which will be supplemented with the shifting of stations, the expansion, and the installation of new telephone exchanges involving something like 30,000 lines, as part of the medium-term plan. Looking at the telex facilities, the region has six new advanced-technology exchanges located at Rio Gallegos (44 lines), Comodoro Rivadavia (44 lines), Trelew (44 lines), General Roca (88 lines), Neuquen (44 lines), and San Carlos de Bariloche (44 lines), all of them connected through the previously mentioned intercity network to the main electronic switching center with program control stored in Bahia Blanca. Plans also call for the expansion of that network on short notice.

In addition to the telecommunications infrastructure outlined in detail here and belonging to ENTEL (National Telecommunications Enterprise), there is a radio electric telegraph and telephone service operated by ENCOTEL (National Mail and Telegraph Enterprise) to serve certain localities in Patagonia not taken care of by ENTEL (see sketch 2); to this service we must add the low-power radioelectric network which takes care of users in rural areas.

As part of the medium-term plan and pertaining to telegraph service, we will set up an automatic message transmission system which will help optimize and rationalize our operations through automatic interconnection by means of an electronic switching center (Federal capital) and public exchanges in 20 cities in Patagonia.

Looking at radio broadcasting as such, sketch 3 shows the location of all broadcasting stations in Patagonia as well as the future stations provided for under the technical documents which will serve as the master plan for the programmed implementation of the National Radio Broadcasting Plan. This technical document takes into account the service requirements and was coordinated with the technical aspects of frequency allocation and broadcasting characteristics. Since the above-mentioned sketch only covers the radio broadcasting station as such using medium waves (hectometric waves), we will now give a breakdown by province and national territory as contained in the document mentioned with respect to radio broadcasting using meter waves (frequency modulation) and television:

Provinces	No of FM stations	No of TV stations	No of TV repeater stations
Rio Negro	7	3	12
Neuquen	5	2	17
Chubut	1	2	4
Santa Cruz	4	7	12
National territory of Tierra del Fuego	3	3	2
Antarctic and Islands in South Atlantic	3	3	2



[Caption on following page]

[See figure on preceding page]

Sketch No 1. Intercity Network (ENTEL).
Key: 1--Existing radio links; 2--Existing overhead lines; 3--Future lines and replacements.

[See figure on following page]

Sketch No 2. Radioelectric Network (ENCOTEL)
Key: 1--Main station; 2--Low-power radio broadcasting station; 3--Radioelectric offices.

GRAFICO 2





[See caption on following page]

[See figure on preceding page]

Sketch No 1. Radio Broadcasting (Medium Wave)
Key: 1--Existing stations; 2--Stations to be added according to plan.

Annex 5: Chilean Broadcasting Stations South of Santiago

Localidad	Señal	Frecuencia	Potencia (Kw)
1	2	3	4
VALPARAISO	CB 73	730 KHz	10
VALPARAISO	CB 78	780 KHz	1
VALPARAISO	CB 84	840 KHz	10
VALPARAISO	CB 90	900 KHz	1
VALPARAISO	CB 97	970 KHz	1
VALPARAISO	CB 103	1030 KHz	1
VALPARAISO	CB 141	1410 KHz	1
VALPARAISO	CB 145	1450 KHz	5
VALPARAISO	CB 160	1600 KHz	0,25
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 57	570 KHz	50
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 63	630 KHz	1
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 66	660 KHz	50
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 69	690 KHz	10
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 78	780 KHz	75
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 93	930 KHz	10
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 89	890 KHz	1
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 99	990 KHz	10
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 101	1010 KHz	10
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 106	1060 KHz	50
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 109	1090 KHz	5
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 114	1140 KHz	50
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 118	1180 KHz	50
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 121	1210 KHz	25
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 130	1300 KHz	5
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 133	1330 KHz	1
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 136	1360 KHz	50
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 140	1400 KHz	10
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 154	1540 KHz	1
SANTIAGO DE CHILE	CB 160	1600 KHz	0,25
SAN ANTONIO	CB 147	1470 KHz	1
MELIPILLA	CB 54	540 KHz	1
RANCAGUA	CC 143	1430 KHz	1
RANCAGUA	CC 151	1510 KHz	1
RANCAGUA	CC 157	1570 KHz	1
SAN FERNANDO	CC 155	1550 KHz	0,25
SANTA CRUZ	CC 158	1580 KHz	0,25
CURICO	CC 145	1450 KHz	1
CURICO	CC 148	1480 KHz	0,25
CONSTITUCION	CC 63	630 KHz	0,1
TALCA	CC 97	970 KHz	1
TALCA	CC 109	1090 KHz	5
TALCA	CC 134	1340 KHz	1
SAN JAVIER	CC 150	1500 KHz	0,25
LINARES	CC 152	1520 KHz	1
CAUQUENES	CC 142	1420 KHz	1
CAUQUENES	CC 132	1320 KHz	0,1
PARRAL	CC 111	1110 KHz	0,1
SAN CARLOS	CC 150	1500 KHz	0,1
CHILLAN	CC 90	900 KHz	1
CHILLAN	CC 134	1340 KHz	1
CHILLAN	CC 108	1080 KHz	1
TALCAHUANO	CC 82	820 KHz	1
TALCAHUANO	CC 148	1480 KHz	1

Localidad 1	Señal 2	Frecuencia 3	Potencia (Kw) 4
CONCEPCION	CC 90	900 KHz	1
CONCEPCION	CC 60	600 KHz	10
CONCEPCION	CC 80	800 KHz	1
CONCEPCION	CC 103	1030 KHz	10
CONCEPCION	CC 120	1200 KHz	1
CONCEPCION	CC 130	1300 KHz	10
CONCEPCION	CC 140	1400 KHz	1
LOTA	CC 153	1530 KHz	1
LOS ANGELES	CD 120	1200 KHz	1
LOS ANGELES	CD 73	730 KHz	0,25
LEBU	CD 151	1510 KHz	1
ANGOL	CD 63	630 KHz	1
PUREN	CD 156	1560 KHz	0,25
MULCHEN	CA 73	730 KHz	1
TRAIGUEN	CD 155	1550 KHz	0,25
VICTORIA	CD 140	1400 KHz	1
CURACAUTIN	CD 84	840 KHz	1
LAUTARO	CD 132	1320 KHz	1
TEMUCO	CD 64	640 KHz	10
TEMUCO	CD 96	960 KHz	1
TEMUCO	CD 111	1110 KHz	1
TEMUCO	CD 127	1270 KHz	0,5
TEMUCO	CD 160	1600 KHz	0,25
PITRUFQUEN	CD 134	1340 KHz	0,5
VILLARRICA	CD 150	1500 KHz	0,5
LONCOCHE	CD 141	1410 KHz	0,1
VALDIVIA	CD 54	540 KHz	1
VALDIVIA	CD 100	1000 KHz	1
VALDIVIA	CD 97	970 KHz	1
VALDIVIA	CD 125	1250 KHz	10
VALDIVIA	CD 130	1300 KHz	10
VALDIVIA	CD 148	1480 KHz	1
LA UNION	CD 82	820 KHz	1
OSORNO	CD 78	780 KHz	10
OSORNO	CD 90	900 KHz	1
PUERTO VARAS	CD 143	1430 KHz	1
PUERTO MONTT	CD 101	1010 KHz	1
PUERTO MONTT	CD 133	1330 KHz	1,2
ANCUD	CD 130	1300 KHz	1
CASTRO	CD 100	1000 KHz	1
PUERTO AYSEN	CD 135	1350 KHz	0,5
COYHAIQUE	CD 97	970 KHz	1
PUERTO NATALES	CD 101	1010 KHz	1
PUNTA ARENAS	CD 89	890 KHz	1
PUNTA ARENAS	CD 109	1090 KHz	1
PUNTA ARENAS	CD 68	680 KHz	10
TALTAL	CA 133	1330 KHz	0,25
VALLENAR	CA 136	1360 KHz	0,25
HUASCO	CA 150	1500 KHz	0,25
VICUNA	CA 108	1080 KHz	1
SAN FELIPE	CB 139	1390 KHz	1
LOS ANDES	CB 147	1470 KHz	0,25
RENCO	CC 150	1500 KHz	0,25
CASETE	CD 158	1580 KHz	0,5
RIO BUENO	CD 154	1540 KHz	0,25
PUERTO WILLIAMS	CD 138	1550 KHz	1

Key: 1--Place; 2--Call sign; 3--Frequency; 4--Output (kw).

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ARTICLE REFLECTS PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK ON MALVINAS ISSUE

Buenos Aires ESTRATEGIA in Spanish No 32, Jul-Aug 79 pp 57-62

[Article by Eduardo van der Kooy: "Malvinas Islands--Negotiations for Return of Island Group more Difficult Following Visit by Nicholas Ridley"]

[Text] On 6 February 1976, Argentina and Great Britain became involved in a maritime incident which brought bilateral relations to an unexpectedly high degree of tension. That was the date when the British oceanographic vessel "Shackleton" leading an exploratory mission to the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), amid a deteriorating diplomatic situation--was intercepted by the ARA "Almirante Storni," a unit of the Argentine navy.

It is not worth pursuing this incident in depth, nor is it the purpose of this article. But it undoubtedly serves as a reference in determining the significance of the tremendous split in relations between Argentina and Great Britain; this even led so far as to the recall of ambassadors by both countries.

Since then, there have been substantial changes in Argentina's domestic situation and, starting in March 1976, we began to face a growing and dangerous isolation of Argentina on the international scene. Through usual diplomatic channels and under strictest secrecy, the Argentine government then tried to restore the situation which looked rather fragile.

This is the background for the nation's policy toward the Malvinas Islands. But there is one more point: Argentina does not feel that restoration of relations with Great Britain is its ultimate objective. To be sure, the resumption of this dialogue, which was interrupted so abruptly, will make it possible to move toward the resolution of an issue which no Argentine administration--regardless of its orientation--has ever dropped: the recovery of the island group which was usurped in 1833.

By February 1977, this had given rise to the so-called Rowlands mission; he is a young Welshman, a Labourite, a student of world history and an ambitious politician who has been undersecretary in the Foreign Office since April 1976. Ted Rowlands' arrival in Argentina, his trip to the

Malvinas Islands, and his subsequent working sessions with officials from the Argentine Foreign Office opened up some expectations, which were gradually discouraged, concerning the possible recovery of the island group by Argentina.

The Rowlands mission undoubtedly was the beginning of a long, thorny, and complex negotiating process which, as such, included moves and countermoves which confused the protagonists themselves. This cycle seemed to reach its high point with the replacement of the government of Great Britain--Conservatives taking over from Labourites--although the arrival of Nicholas Ridley, last July, marked the beginning of an effort whose future development remains yet to be clarified.

Difficult Road

This negotiating process, to which I made reference and which began with the visit by Edward Rowlands, featured two landmarks which were highly important but which were diametrically opposed in terms of their political significance. The first of these consisted of the joint communique released on 26 April 1977; the second one was the meeting held in Lima by the negotiators from both countries. Let us look at each one of them separately. After many days of conversations under tight secrecy between Rowlands and Argentina's deputy foreign minister, Capt Gualter Oscar Allara, "the governments of the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agreed to continue negotiations as of June or July 1977 which will deal with future policies, including sovereignty, with relation to the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the Southern Sandwich Islands, as well as economic cooperation with respect to said territories in particular and the Southwestern Atlantic in general."

The communique did not end there but those few lines contained definitions which, as far as Argentina is concerned, assumed unexpected political projections with relation to the Malvinas Islands. Why? Very simply because, for the first time in the diplomatic history of both countries, Great Britain recognized the existence of "negotiations" and also concretely admitted the possibility of a discussion on "sovereignty." In other words, in accepting negotiations, the parties realized in advance that they would have to implement the practice of "making concessions in order to get something." And here is something that is even more important: from here on in, we have the alternative of arguing about sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. And everything that is subject to this bitter debate not only lacks absolute value but turns out to be downright permeable. This was the boldest step which Argentina has ever forced upon Great Britain in negotiations over the Malvinas Islands. But then there arose some contradictory symptoms which practically paralyzed the negotiations. That is also something that must be pointed out.

Argentina and Great Britain agreed to a first round of negotiations in Rome for July 1977. Undersecretary Allara went there but at Fiumiccino

airport he was notified that his colleague Rowlands was absent; the latter had been replaced by Hugh Cortazzi, a lower-ranking civil servant in the Foreign Office.

Allara decided not to suspend the meetings--a smart decision--but that did not prevent them from getting superficial treatment, while the most urgent issues were simply put down on paper. That was quite logical because Cortazzi did not have the necessary power to go beyond those limits.

It was then agreed to meet again in December of that same year in New York, a city which at that time was going through a very severe winter. There were three days of negotiations--between 13 and 15 December--during which the negotiators took up "future political relations, including sovereignty," as well as "topics of economic cooperation" within a "positive spirit," as defined in the most salient paragraphs of the joint statement.

In spite of a certain degree of optimism which prevailed at the end of this round of conferences, there was a growing impression among the Argentine delegation--including Allara himself--that the road to be followed step by step would offer more than just one obstacle.

The other important landmark emerged in February 1978 and it was a negative one within this prolonged process. At that time, Argentina and Great Britain sent two commissions to Lima with instructions--at least as far as Argentina was concerned--to pursue the topics of sovereignty and economic cooperation in depth.

It was then that a report published in CLARIN stated that "progress continues to be slow but there are unmistakable signs of evolution." So it was--at least prior to the time both delegations sat down opposite each other, in one of the big rooms of the Argentine Embassy in Lima, located in the San Isidro section.

There were some valid antecedents to support that judgment: for example, in January of that year, Argentina had declared null and void the ruling by the British Crown on the Beagle Channel. Quite a few people thought that this action would have an overall influence on bilateral relations. The process of negotiations on the Malvinas Islands could thus be completed.

The meeting was held but ended almost without any significance since both countries raised so many differences that they found it impossible to come up with a final joint communique. It so happened that the treatment of the subject of economic cooperation and sovereignty did not turn out as had been hoped, at least from the viewpoint of Argentina's interests. The development during the last working sessions in Lima demonstrates the separation between these two topics: only the British and Argentine delegates for the economic group got together.

This new development practically, without exaggeration, removed the topic of the Malvinas from this entire process, when Great Britain insisted that the island group "was not negotiable." And there is more: the British delegation also expressed its "rights to the territorial waters and the continental shelf on the basis of the new law of the sea and the application of the 200-mile limit."

Argentina once again rejected this idea and came up with the only possible variant: the territorial integrity of Argentina. But it did leave open the possibility of cooperation in underwater exploitation which, it noted, "in no way affects a political attitude" which is unalterable.

It does not take much to figure out that this meeting in Lima was indeed rather unfortunate for the negotiating process. It marked another clash of widely differing interests which a few months earlier appeared capable of reconciliation.

Argentina had tried to "speed things up" but old and astute British diplomacy was already beginning to implement its delaying tactics. The Labour Party, which was the party in power, could not afford to become involved in a topic--the Malvinas issue--which would make serious trouble for it in parliament.

This of course has to do with a domestic situation, including the current economic outlook. Callaghan's party was subjected to a frontal attack by the Conservatives and the elections--which brought Margaret Thatcher to power--were very close. From then on one could talk in terms of a circumstantial speculation by the Labour Party with respect to negotiations on the Falkland Islands.

But the thing that is not circumstantial is Great Britain's general policy toward its colonies and, logically, toward the Malvinas Islands. And that policy considers the wealth of the Southwestern Atlantic. After Lima came a talk between the then Foreign Minister Oscar Montes and David Owen in the UN and after that there was another meeting, this time in Geneva, which produced little in the way of results.

The change in government in Great Britain prevented any other diplomatic move. The first of these was the recent visit by Nicholas Ridley.

New Cycle

Almost exactly the way it was 2 years before, when Edward Rowlands came, this time 12 persons and an old, red-colored Austin, once again met at Hookers Point airport, in Puerto Stanley, to receive the Deputy Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Nicholas Ridley, who now belonged to the Conservative government.

Ridley's presence this time provided the same scenario but it was much less protagonistic than when Rowlands arrived at [illegible] Faraway Islands.

But there was no room for any strictly partisan speculations. The echo of what might consist of internal struggles within the government of Great Britain barely reached the Malvinas Islands.

But the objective development in this situation, for those of us who had been following these diplomatic developments, was that Ridley had come to the Malvinas without much noise, without the commotion generated by his predecessor's arrival.

There are perhaps many factors one might mention in support of this judgment. But I think one of them is enough: in 1977, during the public celebration in the Town Hall, Rowlands gathered almost 1,000 inhabitants of the islands around him. This time only 300 met and they spent the hour and a half of the meeting, drinking beer and excellent Spanish Sherry.

It was easy to note at that time that the politically aware nucleus of the island group did not want to miss an opportunity to get a close look at the deputy foreign secretary. But neither was it difficult to note that most of the population of Puerto Stanley considered Nicholas Ridley only as just another visitor.

Why this change? There are several explanations. On the one hand, the visits by Rowlands and Ridley were accompanied by widely differing events. The Labourite deputy foreign secretary arrived in Stanley shortly after the maritime incident between Argentina and Great Britain, when bilateral relations had reached their lowest level. And his presence seemed to signify, to the people of the islands, a confirmation of the work which the Shackleton mission had done earlier.

Ridley, on the other hand, arrived in the Falkland Islands in the midst of a long negotiating process between both countries to work out the sovereignty issue. And he arrived at the Falkland islands likewise after the Shackleton mission and the presence of Rowlands had hinted changes to the people of the islands which in the end did not materialize. The inhabitants of the islands know and feel a certain isolation from their home country. The situation of joint government between the Falkland Island Company (FIC) and James Parker has not changed and the economic-social framework continues to reveal the same or even more serious symptoms of deterioration than years ago.

Let us see. Recently, Great Britain has invested little or nothing in the Falkland Islands. It only invested 6 million Pounds Sterling in order to finish the local airport after much time had passed. Now they were engaged in agricultural experiment which is taking shape rather well on the Green Patch farm, one of those visited by Ridley.

The colony's government purchased from the FIC a piece of land, broke it up, and, after payment, proceeded to cede the plots of land to the people of the islands.

The main objective is to provide good pasture land as an indispensable basis for raising sheep. There is no fodder being produced there and these resources are exhausted on many of the 120 little islands constituting the Falkland Islands. This also implies a decline in sheep raising, a drop in wool processing, and a decrease in an activity that is vital for the subsist nce of the island group.

Commerce also held a privileged place in the economic structure of the Falkland Islands. But it is handled practically on a monopoly basis through the Falkland Island Company. This enterprise is a subsidiary of the British financial consortium of Charrington Industrial Holdings; it not only owns the only pier on the islands--where all vessels must necessarily tie up--but it also directly or indirectly dominates other businesses, such as farming, butcher shops, trade, garages, workshops, port facilities, and distributions throughout the interior of the island group via the vessel "Monsunen."

This is why the slow and perhaps insufficient activity of Argentina in those items assumes importance likewise. The people of the Falkland Islands learned to replace the heat from the peat with the gas cans that came in from Comodoro Rivadavia; their Land Rovers run on the fuel supplied to them by the Antares Plant of YPF [Government Petroleum Deposits] located in Stanley; a minimum flow of information reaches them through the Argentine radio stations and the dailies which are patiently distributed twice a week.

As another step in this laborious chain, we might mention that the air force could promote the construction of a pier in the area of the Antares Plant, extending 80 meters into the sea. In that way one counters the monopoly practices of the FIC.

Political Issue

This Argentine approach to the Malvinas Islands undoubtedly has produced positive results. The people of the islands know of the existence of wealth and are directly concerned with one of those sources: fishing operations. There is potential interest in petroleum but the people of the islands are aware that there might be more rumor than reality about that. The colony is also seriously preoccupied with the uncontrolled activities of third countries in southern waters, causing a definite deterioration in the marine fauna. To resolve this issue, they insist on the possibility of an agreement between Argentina and Great Britain.

But there is perhaps a limit to this as far as the people of the islands are concerned and that limit consists of cooperation. It is very difficult and it almost involves a miracle to wrest the native away from his dependence on Great Britain. And this is not a mere coincidence; there is a community with deep roots on the Falkland Islands and the people are prepared to maintain that status.

They recently began to look more toward the continent; they recently learned something more about Argentina. Before that, they did not know much and what little they knew did not stir their enthusiasm.

Just as there is not a single Argentine who doubts for an instant that the islands belong to Argentina by right, so it is difficult to find a Falkland Islander who does not think the opposite.

Ridley himself--and that could not be otherwise--in this dialogue which rubbed the government of Argentina the wrong way (when he pointed out that Argentina could learn from the island system where there are no people under arrest on political charges and where human rights are respected) stressed the colonial awareness of the people of the islands and, in response to a newsman, asserted categorically: "The islands are British."

"The topic of sovereignty continues to be amenable to discussion," he said. But he immediately made it clear that, for the time being, there would be no negotiations but merely meetings. In other words, beyond Labourites or Conservatives--the policy of the Foreign Office prevents contradictory standards for the essence of negotiations--the recognition of Argentine sovereignty--and displays a certain amplitude in considering economic cooperation.

But the confluence of all of these interests, which are pushing us toward a solution, will not be achieved through the weakening of Argentina's negotiating position.

And that weakening must be prevented by defending the basic idea which is only one and which is unalterable: integrating the Malvinas Islands into the national continent.

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